VNCC 30 Jun 1965

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Sam Wilson : USOM Rural Affairs

Indoctrination for new USOM offs:

1. VN war.
2. Political struggle with violent overtones.
3. Revolution in SVN doesn't necessarily belong to the VC. (although).
4. "War can be lost in Saigon but has to be won in the countryside"
5. Though escalating, still a 41-province war.
6. This makes Province Chief of prime importance.
7. USOM rep at province level...

[a. Is Province really best unit — is it really 41-unit war?

[b. How will "revolutionary" program of Ky affect rural reconstruction?

USOM was against "senior US rep" at province level: problems fall rather neatly into 2 spheres; 1 individual couldn't really cover both.

Did Thang; Dunlap; Bird Thuon.

Wilson: "We can stave off defeat by military means; but unless we can build viable local gov, problem will remain. Should be austere in advisory structure, try to get VNese to do jobs.



Have subsector (district) advisors helpful militarily? yes.
(Survey showed, sub-sector advisors spending 2/3 of time/efforts on military problems.)

In March: ~9 provinces, ARD could only

Gittinger Report on Land Reform

Wilson: VNese sensitive to Ramsdale Approach: The Verdict of History.
"50 years from now, will schoolchildren read that you had 5 cars, Swiss bank account, etc. ... or that you gave all your land to the poor, lived in a single room, worked for your country?"
Asked Thuan, "What would effect be if you gave all your lands to the poor, lived austerely?" VNese "very sensitive on this subject."
Land reform, austerity, has great potential mileage.

Jack Ryan: Public Safety officer: Until last summer, no one has been interdicting VC supplies on any highways or rivers. Now, resources control ops in provinces — demanding manifests, checking papers, ... finding pharmaceuticals...
Diem used transfers as a means of punishment; we want 80-90% of policemen to serve in their own provinces.

Want to professionalize police. Police dame had 11 directors in 10 years; nearly all military men, going back to military.
Want career police.

We will never set up a good Diem central intell. org., because they don't trust each other.

Police program: 72,000 by next year (from 33,000 to 55,000 this year).

Policemen: volunteers · 20-35. grade school education; affadavit from district chief; pay ~~school~~ scale start a little above Army, increases geometrically rather than linearly.

No government support for police since Nov 1, 1963: "don't oppress the people — you did it too long under Diem."
No traffic enforcement in Saigon since then. Reason for last summer's riots.

At last (!) separated 9-10 policemen for full-time counter-terror duty in Saigon (after Embassy, My Canh).

"They can kill Taylor, et al, tomorrow."

Counterinsurgency

VC as having the Avis motto: "We're only No. 2; We Try Harder."

Chicom/DRV/VC thinking dominated by initial position of inferiority; problem being to hoard scanty resources, gradually build; take long view (because quick is thoroughly impossible);

Advantages of "inferiority";
1. Lack of responsibilities; can afford to retreat without serious loss of face, backing, effectiveness; no commitment to stand and defend area or population or facilities;

Insurgents

1. U.S. take over Chieu Hoi; and program for encouraging desertions. (a) rallying; b) deserting in battle; c) deserting to homes.
2. U.S. forces set example in encouraging VC desertions, and in treating VC prisoners. (If necessary, encourage VC policy of "deserting to the Americans.")

3. Claim to seal off infiltration by: interdiction, and (b) announcing greatly increased program of sea surveillance; (c) internal resources control (US augmentation of?). ((If you don't want to announce barrier program.))

4. Purpose of US troops: to offset effects of VC drive to take casualties i expanded offensive actions, aimed at winning control of territory and cracking ARVN spirit this year. US troops will: a) act as reserves, forestall VC victories by quick, mobile reaction; bO) break up VC offensive formations by air strikes and offensive probes.

[redacted] determination to defeat the attempt [redacted] direction and support of [redacted] such demonstration: [redacted] in all vulnerable [redacted]

5. U.S. war aims: TO demonstrate our
to impose Communist dictatorships by external a
insurgencies in underdeveloped areas. Alternative to
strong temptation to Communists to foster such insurgencies
areas; and without US/Western assistance, their tactics would b
very widely.

Russ: The Comm administrators in the villages are getting tough, — collecting taxes, etc. — because they are confident of victory. Then, the people are beginning to see that they are not getting the paradise they were offered.

(Comms identified with people...

(cont.) When understood this — need to separate the Comms from the people. Farmers' association;
Vertical approach: Chiefs of Province, District, Canton: police used, at lowest level

Then when began to sermonize, preach ideology & doctrine; but the peasants have their own concerns, they are not interested.

1. Unfortunately, till now govt has attempted to monopolize this problem of organizing the masses. Imagine if in US, CIA tried to use the police to organize trade unions.

Do what was done between 1950-58; organize cells

Trade unions will organize the peasants by focusing on problems of fertilizer, cattle prices; after

Administrators don't understand psychology of masses; they work on "divide & conquer" principle: divide, unstable organisations; this creates vacuum, strengthening the position of the Comms.

Brown: between 1950-58, Bun's union was

Soldiers now feel they are isolated — hated by people — feel they are mercenaries. Could have liaison between army units and union, other orgs, citizens' committees